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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, 
a corporation 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MRS. HELEN SHEEHAN ARTHUR 
and 
MRS. GLENERA SHEEHAN HUNTER, 
vs. 
NICK CHOURNOS and wife, 
vs. 
MIL TON A. OMAN et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9123 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT HELEN SHEEHAN ARTHUR 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above entitled three cases were, as stated by the 
appellant, consolidated for trial before- the District Court of 
Box Elder County, Utah. I am the attorney for Helen Sheehan 
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Arthur, one of the respondents Civil No. 8071. Each proceeding 
is in eminent domain wherein Southern Pacific filed a suit 
to condemn gravel fill material from certain lands owned by 
the respondents. My client owns one half { Vz) interest in 
approximately fifteen thousand {15,000) acres of land on 
Promontory, which includes the North half of Section 1 and 
the South half of Section 2, T. 6. N., R 6. W. S. L. M. The 
material was sought for the purpose of re-location and con-
struction of appellant's main line running across Great Salt 
Lake westerly from Promontory Point in Box Elder County, 
State of Utah. The appellant, in order to obtain said gravel 
and fill material also sought to condemn an easement over the 
properties of the respondents described in appellant's com-
plaint, or a right of entry thereon for a period of three ( 3) 
years and then asked for an order of immediate occupancy 
which was granted October 22nd, 1957. Appellant proceeded 
evidently under Section 78-34-2 {3), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which is: 
nThe right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, 
with the right to take therefrom such earth, gravel, 
stones, trees and timber as may be necessary for some 
public use." 
Respondent sought to obtain the market value of the gravel 
and fill material taken and severance damage. The severance 
damage was caused by the appellant making huge excavations 
in the middle of resp~ndent' s range lands and particularly in 
places on the lands where sheep, when using the range for 
fall and winter pasture, must of necessity travel back and forth 
from the high to the low lands in order to utilize the range. 
The excavations, as left by appellant, created barriers which 
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~: 
divide the range, spoil its use and make it less attractive to 
new tenants who might seek range pasture in the future. 
Little Valley, which will be mentic;>ned considerably 1n 
the record, must be described in ·the interests of showing the 
problem that is peculiar to the respondents in this case. The 
Promontory peninsula extends from the North out into Great 
Salt Lake. It is on the west side and between three and a half 
to four miles north of the Southerly point of the peninsula 
from where the railroad line runs westerly across the lake 
" that the appellant established its work camp called !(Little 
Valley Camp." The camp itself was located in Section 11, 
T. 6 N., R. 6 W. S.L.M., and within a quarter of a mile of 
the lake shore on the westerly side. It was laid out on flat 
open plain that increased in elevation as you traveled easterly. 
Also, immediately to the east and slightly to the North of the 
camp, two steep hills or ranges of land run Easterly forming 
a canyon in between and as you proceeded East through the 
canyon these hills separated and formed a valley. The hill on 
the right, as you traveled East, turned Southerly until you 
reached near the center of Section 8, T. 6 N., 5 W. S.L.M., 
(Tr. 224) then turned back Northerly in a twisting fashion, 
passing South of the center of Section 4 and going on Northerly 
within a quarter of a mile of the East side of Section 3 3 in 
the township to the North, then Northwesterly toward the 
center of Section 29, thence Southwesterly toward the South 
side of Section 31, thence Westerly through Section 36, T. 7 N., 
R. 6. W. S.L.M., where it becomes the left hill as you enter 
the canyon East of the camp site. ·The valley that these hills 
r~ form is known as !(Little Valley" and the floor of this valley 
I c increases in elevation as you travel East and North from the 
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camp site. The only water in this valley was along the Easterly 
mountains on the foot-hills on the Hunter-Arthur property 
(Tr. 225). It was not too dependable and when the sheep 
could not pick up water from snow or the natural feed (Tr. 
22 5) they had to go west, ~own through the canyon to the 
lake shore where there were springs (Tr. 225). There were 
established roads and trails from the West shore East into the 
valley (Tr. 227). The weather conditions on the East side 
of the promontory were more severe in the winter time and 
the snow laid differently in the Little Valley than on the 
East side (Tr. 227). The Little Valley itself, with its natural 
lay of the land, made it possible for the sheep to drift from 
the high lands to· the low lands on the West lake shore line 
when the weather was bad and then ~ack up when the ~eather 
cleared, all in a natural manner with great protection (Tr. 
227). When the cuts were made by the appellant the big 
conveyor belts were placed right in the canyon of ttLittle Valley" 
and the materials were taken from one side across to the 
other and for great distances up through it. After the taking 
was finished the appellant had taken approximately, from all 
sources, 44 million cubic yards of fill (Tr. 303). They left the 
banks steep and dangerous so as to be a great hazard to live-
stock (Tr. 164-5). The appellant made no attempt to level 
out the sides of the cut and the jury was taken out and given 
a view of the premises which showed vertical sides varying 
from a few feet in height in some places to ten or twenty times 
that in others. This great hole in the entrance to Little Valley 
literally divided· up the use that a livestock man could ever 
make of the area (Tr. 162-166). When this problem was 
approached in the course of the trial, that is, either severance 
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damage that the excavation had caused to the range, or damage 
which might result to the owner in costs in leveling out the 
steep banks so as to remove the hazard to the livestock (Tr. 
167-168), the court insisted that an election must be made, 
that we could not have both forms of damage, and said: 
nTHE COURT: If you want severance damage, then 
the cost of pushing down the banks becomes imma-
terial. If you want the cost of fixing that so the sheep 
can go down there, why, you can pursue that. But I 
question that you can have both of them. In fact, I'll 
require you to ·elect." (Tr. 168, line 11-15). 
As a consequence the respondents elected to pursue their 
right to severance damages and abandoned their efforts to 
make proof of the cost of restoration of the sides of the gravel 
pits so as to remove the hazard and danger to livestock. 
Now in regard to the gravel itself. Appellant's own witness 
testified that the appellant itself owned a gravel pit on the 
very point of the promontory where the railroad crosses (Tr. 
306) located in Section 28, T. 6. N., R. 5 W., but did not 
want to use that because of the distance. He also said (Tr. 
304) that they looked at other areas than those chosen that 
were at distances farther away varying more than a mile, but 
they picked these particular locations (Tr. 305) because of 
location and quality of material. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POIN'T I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF 
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CERTAIN .WITNESSES OF RESPONDENTS AS TO THE 
VALUE OF THE GRAVEL AND FILL MATERIAL TAKEN 
B·Y APPELLANT; AND IN RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE 
THE RESPONDENTS' EXHIBIT 2 SHOWING OTHER 
GRAVEL SALES. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE 
QUESTION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES, AND BY AD-
MITTING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN TESTIMONY 
PERTAINING THERETO. 
(a) THE FACTS OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE AND 
THE PHYSICAL MAKEUP OF LITTLE VALLEY AND 
ITS PARTICULAR USE IN CONNECTION WITH 
DEFENDANTS' OTHER LANDS WAS PROOF OF 
ITSELF THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER SIMILAR 
LANDS AVAILABLE. 
(b) THE DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPOND-
ENTS' WITNESSES WERE FROM APPELLANT'S 
OPERATIONS UPON LANDS OWNED BY RE-
SPONDENTS AND THEIR RIGHT OF ENTRY 
THEREON. 
(c) THE SO-CALLED ~~SEVERANCE'' DAMAGES 
TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES 
CONSISTED OF DAMAGES THAT WOULD RESULT 
TO AN OWNER IN THE USE OF HIS LAND IN 
LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS ·oR TO AN OWNER IF 
10 
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HE ATTEMPTED TO LEASE THE LANDS FOR A 
LIVESTOCK OPERATION BY THE LANDS BEING 
LESS DESIRABLE OR USEABLE TO A TENANT. 
(d) RESPONDENTS' DAMAGES WERE NOT AR-
RIVED AT BY ADDING ·THE VALUES OF DIFFER-
ENT USES FOR THE LAND TAKEN. 
(e) RESPONDENTS DID PRESENT COMPETEN1~ 
EVIDENCE OF THE MARKET VALUE OF THEIR 
REMAINING LANDS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN 
DAMAGED. 
(f) THE TESTIMONY DOES ESTABLISH SEVER-
ANCE DAMAGE OF RESPONDENTS' LANDS AS 
THAT TERM IS CONTEMPLATED AND USED IN 
THE COURT DECISIONS AND THE STATUTES. 
POINT III 
THE VERDICT IS NO~f EXCESSIVE NOR THE RE-
SULT OF PREJUDICE OF THE JURY, BUT IS IN KEEP-
ING WITH THE 'TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES OF 
~~.: BOTH THE APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS. 
' )'..'~ 
:f. 
1l: 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF 
CERTAIN WITNESSES OF RESPONDENTS AS TO THE 
VALUE OF THE GRAVEL AND FILL MATERIAL TAKEN 
BY APPELLANT; AND IN RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE 
THE RESPONDENTS' EXHIBIT 2 SHOWING OTHER 
GRAVEL SALES. 
POINT III 
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE NOR THE RE-
SULT OF PREJUDICE OF THE JURY, BUT IS IN KEEP-
ING WITH THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES OF 
BOTH THE APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS. 
Counsel for the appellant takes the peculiar position that 
unless the defendants could present evidence of market value 
of the property taken at the exact place of taking, that our 
hands are then tied and we have no alternative but to accept 
the unconscionable offer made by the appellant ,of 2/lOths of 
a cent a cubic yard for the material that they might want. 
12 
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Gravel pits or gravel deposits throughout the State of 
Utah have a definite and fixed value of between one and one-
half cents to fifteen cents per yard, but the market for a par-
ticular gravel pit generally depends upon a demand being 
created in a particular locality caused by construction of some 
kind, sometimes roads, sometimes industries and sometimes 
from other sources and any particular gravel pit or deposit 
is made marketable generally because of two or three different 
things, and this was set out in particular by one of respondents' 
witnesses, Douglas J. Fife, who has been in the general con-
tracting and sand and gravel business for thirty years (Tr. 64 
line 12) and during that time has had occasion to bid on many 
public work jobs. He was asked the question: 
t!Q. What makes a pit desirable, Mr. Fife, for con-
struction work? 
A. Well, of course, the demand. If they're building 
a new road through a section of country and there are 
no pits available, we go· out and prospect and find 
pits, and then negotiate with the owner to buy_ the 
material. 
Q. What do you look for in locating those? What is 
the desire in regard to accessibility or grades or types 
of formation of the sand? 
A. Well, of course, vve generally look for gravel 
and we try to find a pit as close to the project as possible 
to cut down the haul. (Tr. 65, lines 2-13). 
Mr. Jack Parsons, another witness for. the respondents, 
is in the sand and gravel business both at Smithfield, Cache 
County, Utah, and Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah, 
and has been in the busjness for 25 years. He testified that 
13 
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in the course of time he had opened up many gravel pits (Tr. 
132 line 18) and he was asked the following: 
t(Q. What makes a gravel pit valuable to you as a 
contractor? 
A. I'd say location, quantity and quality and probably 
accessibility." (Tr. 133 line 6). 
He was asked further questions as follows: 
~~Q. Does the gravel become more valuable per cubic 
yard the closer you can get it to your project? 
A. Right. 
Q. Is that because of the haul problem? 
A. Yes, the haul would be lessened and the gravel 
itself wouldn't be any more valuable, but the cost in 
producing it would be less." (Tr. 133 lines 18-24). 
He was then asked this question as follows: 
(CQ. And you consider this of an average quality. 
Now, do you have an opinion as to what the fair reason-
able market value was, as of the 22nd day of October, 
1957, per cubic yard in place, of the gravel that was 
in the north pits? You can answer that <eyes" or "no" 
whether you have an opinion. 
A. I do not have an opinion. 
Q. As to what its value was? 
A. No, I have an opinion of what I've paid for 
material similar on my own projects, but to place a 
value there, I wouldn't have an opinion. 
Q. _I'll ask yo~ this w~y. What have y~u paid for 
matertal of stmtlar quahty on your own projects." 
(Tr. 135 lines 2-13). 
14 
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Mr. O'Conner at that point wanted to voir dire the witness 
and asked him this question: 
"Q. Where is that other material located? 
A. Well, I have seventeen miles of interstate high-
way going approximately forty miles to the north of 
our said exhibit at the present time, and that is similar 
material. 
Q. You mean you're selling gravel to a project some 
forty miles to the north of this pit; is that it? 
A. I'm not selling it. I'm buying it. That is a state 
highway." (Tr. 135 lines 24-30). 
The court allowed him to ansv1er as follows: 
nTHE COURT: Just give us a figure, Mr. Parson. 
A. Two cents a yard." (Tr. 136, line 17). 
He was then asked if he had other projects going on through-
out the State of Utah where he had purchased fill 1naterial of 
similar kind and grade and again Mr. O'Conner, attorney for 
appellant, sought to question him on voir dire and asked 
him where the jobs were located, as follows: 
CCA. Well, from Smithfield north, one project and 
Grantsville west. There are two projects there. 
Q. Was the source of the material close to the job 
on those two ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How far away approximately? 
A. Oh, probably four or five hundred yards from 
the highway. 
MR. O'CONNER: I see. Go ahead. 
BY MR. MANN: 
15 
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Q. And what did you pay for those? 
A. The lowest was a cent and a half and the highest 
I think about eight cents." (Tr. 137 lines 4-14). 
He was then asked again, as follows: 
ceQ. But you have used fill material then between one 
and a half to eight cents ? 
A. Right." (Tr. 138 lines 11-13). 
and of course he had already testified that they were of the 
same kind and quality and quantity as that that the appellant 
was seeking to take. 
On re-direct examination he was asked again, as follows: 
ceQ. Mr. Parson, isn't it a fact that any gravel pit that 
you have opened up for construction work, there was 
not a market for that particular gravel until your project 
came into being ? 
A. Right. 
Q. And when the job came into being, then there 
was· a demand for gravel in the locality? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that created an immediate market for it? 
A. Right." (Tr. 141 lines 4-12). 
At the close of the testimony of Mr. Parsons (Tr. 143) 
it was called to the court's attention that we had a Mr. Hunsaker 
and a Mr. Germer, both contractors using sand and gravel, 
and that their testimony would be similar to that of Mr. Parsons 
and counsel for appellant and myself both stipulated that they 
would testify similar to Mr. Parsons, and the court said: 
uTHE COURT: You understand that. If Mr. Germer 
and Mr. Hunsaker were called, he'd testify the same 
as Mr. Parsons." (Tr. 143 lines 9-11). 
16 
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Now, Mr. Fife, who was called (Tr. 68 line 2) testified 
that the average market value in his opinion was five cents per 
cubic yard. Melbourne Ford, who \vas called as a respondents' 
witness, who was also a general contractor and had been in 
the business since 1948 (Tr. 89 line 28) at Provo, Utah, (Tr. 
100 line 21) testified that the material taken by the appellant 
was worth five cents per yard. J. Gibbons of the firm of Gibbons 
and Reed Construction Company ( T r. 41 line 21) testified 
that in his opinion (Tr. 46 line 3) that the material was 
worth five cents per cubic yard. Lee E. Young, an employee 
of the State Land Board (Tr. 118 line 13), who had been 
employed for a period of ten years as manager, executive 
secretary and director) and also as Chief Land Examiner, stated 
(Tr. 118 line 27) that his duties were land management, land 
appraisement, land sales, land acquisition and mineral and 
surface leasing, and he testified (Tr. 119 line ·16) about the 
. Promontory gravel: 
nA. Well, I was there on a gravel inspection in July 
of 1955." 
He further testified that he had received an application to 
·lease gravel on Section 36, T. 7 N., R 6. W. S.L.M., which is 
the section just adjacent to the Hunter-Arthur lands that were 
condemned by the appellant. He said that one J. P. Under-
wood of Ogden (Tr. 120 line 20) was seeking to make a 
gravel lease upon this section and that he· found gravel deposits 
on it. He was asked about the lease as follows: 
, 
((Q. And in regard to lease on section thirty-six, was 
that leased at the minimum or maximum ? 
A. The minimum for gravel. 
17 
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Q. And can you tell us why this was leased at the 
minimum? 
A. For the reason that it isn't too accessible and 
there is a lot of waste on the section. Accessibility isn't 
nearly as available as the adjacent lands in that vicinity. 
Some of the adjacent lands." (Tr. 123 lines 2-9). 
He then testified that it was leased to the individual for one 
and a half cents per cubic yard and the lease entered into. 
He further testified (Tr. 127 line 1) that they have leases 
entered into by their office as high as fifteen cents per yard 
for gravel. 
Mr. O'Conner stated on his openmg statement to the 
jury as follows: 
t t • • • Much of our case has been presented by the 
witnesses for the defendant; that is through parts where 
I cross examined and their own answers. . . . " (Tr. 
247 lines 18-21). 
Counsel for the respondents feels that Mr. O'Conner's state-
ment is true, that he made his case and in doing so also made 
the case for the respondents. The court's attention is called to 
the fact that on his cross examination and when he was cross. 
examining J. R. Gibbons ( T r. 49 line 21) in regard to the 
cost of removing or transporting the gravel, he asked the 
question: 
·ttQ. Is seven cents a ton mile sound reasonable?" 
And again to the same witness he said: 
t(Q. Now, if the truck rate is even five cents a ton 
mile-that is, five cents for every ton hauled a mile 
from Promontory Point to any market-wouldn't that 
make the purchase of it at this five cents a yard pro-
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hibitive as far as competing with the Brigham City 
market?" (Tr. 51-lines 3-7). 
In his cross examination of Douglas J. fife, about the cost 
of hauling per ton mile, it states: 
~~A. Well, you might get it hauled for six cents, but 
I think your figure of seven cents is a good figure.'' 
(Tr. 71 lines 19-20). 
On his cross examination of Melbourne Ford, asking about 
hauling costs: 
nA. I'd say fron1 five to seven cents a ton mile." 
(Tr. 110 line 21). 
All of which impressed the jury of the value of having the 
material as accessible as possible. Then when its own witness, 
Denny Reynolds Bagley, the project engineer, took the stand, 
he testified under direct examintion that the value per cubic 
yard of materials taken from the Chournos and Hunter-Arthur 
properties was : 
nA. Two mills per cubic yard." (Tr. 300 line 19). 
On cross examination he was asked the ratio of two mills 
to five cents and he told the jury it was 1-25 (Tr. 302). He 
had testified that he had bought some gravel during the 
construction from the Fife Sand and Gravel Company at 
Brigham City, and had paid $1.35. He was asked the com-
parison between t\\'0 mills and $1.3 5 and he said it was 
about 1-600 (Tr. 302 lines 14 and 15). He was asked if he 
checked the pit area to make sure it met the qualifications 
necessary to make the road bed fill ( Tr. 302) and he said it 
was suitable and desirable for their needs. He was asked if 
he had checked other areas for the purpose of satisfying their 
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needs and he advised (Tr. 304 line 13) that he had checked 
areas South and East and that they were at greater distances 
bearing up to a lit~le over a mile further in distance. 
Consequently, I say in all earQ.estness, that when Mr. 
O'Conner brought out from nearly each and every one of 
our witnesses that the haulage cost of gravel was seven cents 
a mile that he, through his own efforts, impressed upon the 
jury that because of the location of out pits and their acces-
sibility that there was a consideration that any buyer would 
give if he sought to purchase from a willing seller. He was then 
asked about why they picked these pits and he said: 
c'A. They were picked because of the combination 
of location and quality." (Tr. 305 lines 5 and 6). 
Later on, on re-cross examination by Mr. Oman, Mr. Bagley 
was asked (Tr. 306 line 10) if Southern Pacific, the appellant, 
did not have a gravel pit just north of the old Promontory 
Station and he admitted that they did. He was asked why 
they did not take the gravel from that location and he advised 
(Tr. 306 line 22) because of the distance. Mr. O'Conner 
had played on distance and costs and again I say that the 
location and quality of material on respondents' land, together 
with their availability to any purchaser either now or in the 
immediate future was impressed upon the jury by Mr. O'Con-
ner. 
The courts are, of necessity, given wide discretion in 
placing limits on the extent to which other comparable sales 
are admissible in evidence for the purpose of establishing a 
market value (see Ramming Real Estate Co. vs. United States, 
122 F2d 892 (8th Cir. 1941); Forest Preserve Dist. vs. Dra-
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per, 387 Ill. 149, 56 N.E. 2nd 410 ( 1944); In re Edward J. 
Jeffries Homes Housing Project, 306 Mich. 638, 11 N.W. 
2d 272 (1943). 
The case of State of Utah vs. Peek, 265 P .2d 630, 1 Utah 
2d 263 ( 1953), has been referred to and quoted on page 17 
of the appellant's brief; however, the quotation is incom-
plete and not fully understood without the remaining portion 
of the quoted paragraph being given, which portion is as 
follows: 
HThis is a. preliminary question for the trial judge 
to determine before such evidence is admissible, and 
his determination should be followed by the appellate 
court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. It is also 
within the sound discretion of the trial judge to limit 
the amount of such evidence in the interest of avoiding 
confusion of the issues and the undue consumption of 
time." (I Utah 2d page 273). 
Another case in point is Baetjer vs. United States, 143 
F.2d 391, 397 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 324 U.S. 772 ( 1944): 
((The questions of whether such transactions are near 
enough in time, or involve substantially similar lands, 
or significant amounts of land are all questions of the 
remoteness of the evidence offered and in consequence 
are for the trial court.'' 
In 20 C.J. page 777, under a title ((Special Value to Taker 
and Adaptability to Purpose for Which Taken," the article 
says that we do not attempt, in condemnation proceedings, 
to have the value fixed on a basis of benefit which the property 
, may be to the other party to the proceedings, but gives the 
exception, which is: 
. . The true rule is that any use for which the 
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property is capable may be considered, and if ~he ~an~ 
has an adaptability for the purposes f~r wh1c~ 1t 1s 
taken, the owner may have this. cons1dered 1n the 
estimate as well as any other use for which it is cap-
able." (See cases cited thereunder) . 
Following this same theory in 29 C.J.S. on page 1028 we have, 
under ( (Special Value to Taker and Adaptability to Purpose 
for Which Taken'' as follows: 
nAs stated supra Art. 136, compensation must be 
reckoned fron1 the standpoint of what the landowner 
loses by having his property taken, not by the benefit 
which the property may be to the other party to the 
proceedings; therefore the value of the parcel to the 
condemnor, or the need of acquiring the particular 
parcel for the proposed improvement, or the value 
that would accrue to the land from the construction 
of the contemplated improvement, cannot be considered 
as an element of damage to the land owner; neither 
can an amount that has at some time been expended 
on the property in question, which has rendered it 
specially suitable for the use for which it is being 
condemned, be claimed by the landowner, but such 
improvements may be considered in so far as they 
enhance the value of the property. The rule that the 
value of the property to the condemnor is not to be 
considered does not mean that the adaptability of the 
land taken for the purposes of the condemnor may 
not be considered, along with any other uses for which 
the land is available, in detern1ining its market value, 
provided the prospective demand for such use of the 
land by prospective purchasers or condemnors affects 
the present market value of the land.'' 
There are many cases cited under this, two of which I 
wish to discuss. One is aCalifornia case, Ten1escal Water Co. 
vs. Marvin, 9 P2d 3 3 5. ··rhis was an action by a water com-
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pany to condemn a reservotr site for the impounding of 
water and two hydraulic engineers testified. It appears from 
the evidence that they tried to testify and fix value to the 
condemnor according to his particular benefits, but not strictly 
market value and the court properly pointed out that the 
question was not what the property was worth to the person 
intending to acquire it, by condemnation, but it did state what 
could have been offered. On page 3 3 7, right hand column, it 
said: 
" ... The jury had a right to consider the fact, in 
determining the market value, that the land in con-
troversy was in proximity to a dam-site, and to con-
sider its adaptability for reservoir purposes and to 
determine whether or not its market value had been 
enhanced by improvements put upon adjoining prop-
erty; . . . " 
The court then went on to discuss a prior decision, being 
City of Stockton vs. Ellingwood, 275 P. 228, and in the right 
hand column, page 239, it said: 
((In determining values in actions of eminent domain, 
where, for certain purposes, the lands are extreme! y 
valuable, and for other and different purposes are of 
little or no value, courts are confronted with many 
difficulties, the chief of which is sometimes the ap-
parent fact that there is no market value, in the strict 
sense of the word, but that this does not entitle a 
plaintiff to take the lands sought to be condemned 
without paying just compensation." 
And the court again, quoted from Spring Valley Water-Works 
vs. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 28 P.682: 
cc ••• The question is thus presented whether, assum-
ing that the land sought to be taken was specially 
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valuable for the purpose named, it was relevant and 
competent to show such value. There is undoubtedly 
some conflict in the authorities as to the admissibility 
of questions put in this form; but we think the point 
was decided in favor of the admissibility of such evi-
dence in the case of Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 
Cal. 63, 20 Pac. Rep. 3 72, and in the same case on 
a second appeal to this court, 88 Cal. 50, 25 Pac. Rep. 
977 ( 11 L.R.A. 604) . . . " 
Another very interesting case also cited in the footnotes 
last referred to in 29 C.J.S. page 1028 is the Union Explora-
tion Company vs. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, 89 
P2d 2 57, a Colorado case. In this particular action it was very 
necessary that a tunnel for the carrying of a railroad and 
water through the Continental Divide be made. The plaintiff 
went into possession of the property on an agreement pro-
viding that third parties would attempt to negotiate the value 
to be paid for the timber and easement. When the negotiators 
could not arrive at an acceptable solution, the action was 
commenced and considered one in eminent domain to determine 
how much would be paid to the Union Exploration Company. 
This is a lengthy decision with many cases cited. The testimony 
involved a great difference in values, such as one person's 
testimony of $10.00 per acre as against the experts' testimony 
of a total of $357,000.00. And the court, in the right hand 
columt?- page 261, said: 
nThe present situation of the defendant's land is 
out of the ordinary. In determining the value of its 
lands, or the value to be paid it, it is difficult to find 
any precedent or any rule that can be applied. If we 
were to assume that the land is only valuable for pas-
ture, or for timber purposes, the amount could be 
found in a very simple way, but when we have to con-
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sider all of the facts and circumstances, and fix the 
value to this property, for all reasonable purposes, 
it is difficult under the testimony offered to apply any 
of the known rules of law in fixing values . . . '' 
Starting on the right hand column, page 262, in the case case, 
we have: 
" ( 4-6) Defendant's counsel contend that ((The most 
profitable and advantageous use to which the property 
is adapted is the basis upon which fair compensation 
should be determined.'' We think this proposition is 
correct. Section 17, Chapter 61, '35 C.S.A. Cases to 
this effect could be cited without number. We call 
attention to a few mentioned in defendant's brief: 
Colorado M. Ry Co. v. Brown, 15 Colo. 193, 25. P.87; 
Denver & R.G.R.R. Co., v. Griffith, 17 Colo. 598, 31 
P. 171; Denver, N.W. & P.R. Co. v. Howe, 49 Colo. 
256, 112 P. 779; Scurvin Ditch Co. v. Roberts, 58 Colo. 
533, 146 P. 233; Wassenrich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 
186 P. 533, 53 7 ... 
((We call attention also to Harrison v. Young, 9 
Ga. 359, and Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30. In its 
opinion in the latter case the court "'said: ((It is not 
difficult to see that such prospective value of a piece 
of ground might be its chief element of value to its 
owner. An owner of land, peculiarly situated by reason 
of its proximity to some great city or great work of 
internal improvement, may look into the future and 
see t~at it will, at some distant day, become extremely 
valuable by reason of its situation, and that none other 
can be procured for the purpose for which he antici-
pates that it will be needed. He desires, accordingly, 
to keep it, knov:ing that it will be a fine property for 
his children, if not for himself. If deprived of that 
property for public purposes, and especially for the 
benefit, at the same time, of a private company, can 
he have (just compensation' unless reference is had 
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to the prospective value of the land, and unless that is, 
to some extent at least, taken into account?" 
In Mississippi & R. River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 
U. S. 403, 407, 25 L. Ed. 206, speaking with respect 
to compensation the court laid down the following 
rule: C(In determining the value of land appropriated 
fo~ public purposes, the same considerations are to be 
regarded as in a sale of property between private par-
ties. The inquiry in such cases must be what is the 
property worth in the market, viewed not merely with 
reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, 
but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly 
adapted; that is to say, what is it worth from its 
availability for valuable uses. Property is not to be 
deemed worthless because the owner allows it to go 
to waste, or to be regarded as valueless because he 
is unable to put it to any use. Others may be able to 
use it, and make it subserve the necessities, or con-
veniences of life. Its capability of being made thus 
available gives it a market value which can be readily 
estimated. 
c c So many and varied are the circumstances to be 
taken into account in determining the value of property 
condemned for public purposes, that it is perhaps 
impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraise-
ment in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will 
modify the most carefully guarded rule; but, as a 
general thing, we should say that the compensation 
to the owner is to be ·estimated by reference to the uses 
for which the property is suitable, having regard to 
the existing business or wants of the comn1unity, or 
such as n1ay be reasonably expected in the immediate 
future." 
ccin Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Gage,"286 
Ill. 213, 121 N. E. 582, 587, the Supreme Court stated 
the rule as follows: ccThe owner of land appropriated 
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for a public use is entitled to its value for the most 
profitable use for which it is available, and a capacity 
for a future use which may be anticipated with rea-
sonable certainty, though dependent upon circumstances 
which may possibly never occur is competent to be 
shown and considered by the jury in fixing the com-
pensation if the capacity for such use in fact enhances 
the market value of the land ought to be taken in its 
present condition and state of improvement." 
In summing this up it is quite apparent that we have this 
situation. The respondents offered testimony that throughout 
the State of Utah for any gravel pits that have b~en opened 
up, and some were within forty miles immediately north and 
others less than twenty miles, just across the Promontory 
Point in Ogden, and one immediately adjacent to the lands 
taken, that the price varied from one cent where the State 
Land Board dealt with the State Road Commission being 
the lowest figure, up to as high as fifteen cents for gravel 
of similar kind and quantity and quality, with the state 
minimum royalty to individuals or private corporatio~s of 
one and one-half cents. When we compare this with the two 
tenths of a cent testified to by witnesses of the appellant, 
appellant's figure appears all out of reason. It was also shown 
that the appellant itself had other quantities of gravel right 
on Promontory Point, rea.dily accessible for it, that it chose 
to condemn the lands of the respondents for the purpose of 
taking the gravel fill because of the location, quantity and 
quality of the materials sought to be condemned, or, in other 
words, the adaptability of this particular gravel deposit. If 
it were convenient and adaptable to appellant, it also had that 
same convenience and adaptability to any other individual 
that might wish to purchase in the future and ship to other 
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points. The testimony also shows that the appellant laid great 
stress on the cost of hauling gravel. All of which no doubt 
impressed the jury as to the adaptability of the respondents' 
supply. The price determined by the jury of three cents per 
cubic yard shows that they did not fix the price based on 
appellant's needs or its value to it, or it would certainly have 
been higher than the cost of hauling of a ton mile of seven 
cents because their nearest other source was more than a mile 
away. They did not reach the figure shown in any exhibit 
that the appellant, with tongue in cheek, says was prejudicial 
error to admit, nor did they go down to the unconscionable 
figur,e that appellant claimed. But, by the weight of all the 
testimony, the jury fixed the fair, reasonable market value of 
the gravel per cubic yard in place for its wonderful adaptability 
for a gravel pit. 
When I say the appellant, with tongue in cheek, talks 
about prejudicial error or reversible error, I would like, for 
just one moment, to go into the testimony of the witness 
Dell Adams, offered by appellant in support of its contention 
of two tenths of a cent per cubic yard. Dell Adams was put 
on the stand as a witness for appellant, in the absence of a 
jury (Tr. 307 line 11), to determine the admissibility of his 
testimony. After considerable testimony to the effect that the 
contract for the purchase of the n1aterials from him at two-
tenths of a cent per yard not only covered the taking of the 
material but covered all severance damage and the leaving 
of the holes from which the material w~s removed in the 
exact condition they would be in after the material was taken, 
etc., counsel for the respondents moved (Tr. 317 line 2): 
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HMR. MANN: If it please the court, we move that 
the evidence be not admitted. The witness has now 
testified that it is not only for the price of gravel but 
it's for the damage done to the severance of the land 
and of every kind, and we have a Utah case that speci-
fically sets out that if the price includes the purchase 
price and the damage, that it cannot be offered, and 
that's that case I cited to you." 
After further argument, Mr. Adams was brought back before 
the jury (Tr. 326) and the court allowed him to proceed to 
offer in his contract (Tr. 330 line 25). He officially offered 
it at that time and before the court ruled on it, I asked to voir 
dire Mr. Adams (Tr. 331 line 11 to page 332 line 19): 
nBY MR. MANN: 
Q. Mr. Adams, in your discussions w~th these people 
and for the taking of 56,000,000 cubic yards, did you 
discuss that they would have to dig this yardage out 
of your lands? 
A. That's all I could sell them was my lands. 
Q. Yes. And that they would dig huge holes in 
taking it out in order to satisfy the . requirement of your 
contract of 56,000,000 yards? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And did the price that you agreed on in this con-
tract for taking out this 56,000,000 yards take care of 
all of the dirt taken out as well as the holes that might 
be dug upon your land and the leaving of your land, 
when they finished, with the holes in place without 
filling it back in any way? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Did you at that time consider that when they 
would pay you the sum specified in the contract, that 
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it would be payment in full of the purchase price and 
any damage done to your lands and the leaving of your 
lands in the condition that they would have to be left 
in? 
A. I was quite willing to sell them this material, 
for up to 56,000,000 yards, at two-tenths of a cent 
a yard. 
Q. Now you haven't answered my question. Did it 
include both the digging of the dirt-
A. Well, for a hundred thousand dollars, Walt, yes. 
Q. And you understood that wherever they dug this 
topsoil out, that-
A. That was my loss. 
Q. That was your loss? 
A. That's right. 
Q. That would be part of the loss you would sustain? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And when you sized it all up in every way with 
the loss taken into consideration · and the dirt they 
would take out and the hole they would leave and the 
compensation that you would get, you accepted it and 
entered into the contract? 
A. That's right. 
MR. lvfANN: nNow for the purpose of the record 
we object to the offer going in, plaintiff's exhibit eight, 
or any testimony further in regard to price on this." 
The court officially received it (Tr. 333 line 26): 
nTHE COURT: Well, I guess to be consistent the 
court should receive the contract, but I'm inclined to 
sustain the objection now and let the case go forward. 
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MR. O'CONER: You mean you're going to change 
your ruling? 
THE COURT: Well, the witness has testified to the 
substance of the contract on cross examination. I want 
to be consistent, though. I guess in fairness to your 
side of the case I'd better receive the contract.',. 
And the contract was received. 
The case that had been cited was Weber County vs. Ritchie 
et ux, 98 U. 272, 96 P2d 744, where it held, bottom left hand 
column, page 746: 
n ( 3, 4) Appellants offered in evidence the testimony 
of another landowner of the vicinity. They sought to 
prove the value of the Ritchie land taken by proving 
what this other owner had received from the County 
for his land for the same project. However, on voir dire 
it was disclosed that the sum of money this landowner 
received included damages to his remaining land. The 
court ruled out the testimony of this witness upon the 
ground that itwas not proper evidence of value. Under 
the authorities we think this was correct. Although the 
decisions divide upon the question of admissibility of 
amounts paid by the condemnor for other lands, there 
is little disagreement that compromise settlements, in-
cluding damages, are not admissible. The proposed 
testimony did not segregate the sale price from the 
damages. It is questionable whether the price, had it 
been segregated, would have been proper testimony 
under the definition of market value as applicable to 
condemnation proceedings. 18 Am. Jur., p. 996, Sec. 
352 and cases cited thereunder. Generally see 118 
A.L.R. 869, citing Telluride Power Co. v. Bruneau, 
41, Utah 4, 125 P. 399, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1251 .. " 
It is beyond the writer's comprehension to understand 
how attorney for appellant can, at this stage of the proceedings, 
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after having his Exhibit No. 8 received as evidence, when a 
recent Utah case was presented to the court, which, in effect,; 
held that it was improper, can talk about prejudical error. 
Particularly so when he offered no cases to the court in support' 
of any of his contentions at the time of trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE 
QUESTION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES, AND BY AD-
MITTING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN TESTIMONY 
PERTAINING THERETO. 
(a) THE FACTS OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE AND 
THE PHYSICAL MAKEUP OF LITTLE VALLEY AND 
ITS PARTICULAR USE IN CONNECTION WITH 
DEFENDANTS' OTHER LANDS WAS PROOF OF 
ITSELF THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER SIMILAR 
LANDS AVAILABLE. 
The writer agrees that Section 78-34-10 (2) U.C.A. 1953, 
as set out by appellant in his brief is the statutory law govern-
ing what has been termed ((severance damages" and as a 
consequence will not recopy the law. 
In the statement of facts set out by the writer the Little 
Valley itself was particular! y described because of its peculiar 
make up, how it is used in the winter months (which are the 
most hazardous to range livestock operations) which made 
this part of the range belonging to respondents (with · their 
established personal rights to the use of trails and roads up 
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through the same when not on their own properties) excep-
tionally valuable to an owner. And that this was so whether 
the owner operated his own operation or whether as in the 
Hunter-Arthur case, they leased the same and were able to 
demand and receive a good high rental for the use of this 
valuable range. 
The appellant dug a huge excavation across the lands of 
respondents and the roadways and entrances into Little Valley 
and on up into the Valley so as to actually create a barrier 
and then it left that barrier forever for the livestockmen to 
try and force their sheep or livestock around if they are to 
utilize their lands that were not taken. They, by this taking, 
created, or caused, damage to the remainder interest of the 
respondents in this. 1,hey must put up with the hazards of 
having their sheep stampeded or driven unintentionally with 
sheep dogs (Tr. 164-38) over the steep banks and injured 
or killed. They must put up with having the mother ewe 
separated from the lamb as the sheep seek water (Tr. 163-2); 
cave-ins, or the banks giving way (Tr. 165-14); working 
with the livestock in the night time when it becomes necessary 
(Tr. 165-21) around such a hazard; lambs playing in the 
vicinity and going over the sides to destruction (Tr. 165-29); 
and something unexpected that cannot be guarded against 
spooking the sheep and possibly a thousand of them at once 
going over the steep banks (Tr. 228-25). The hazard will 
be there forever if the land is left like it is now (Tr. 166-27). 
The severance damage that was done by appellant here 
is not like the facts recited in the Provo River Water Users' 
Assn. v~ Carlson, 133 P.2d 277. There they took the fee 
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title as to a pasture of 18.75 acres of land that was _located 
about a mile and a half away from the owner's other farm 
property. Here they go right out in the middle of our holdings 
and take what earth, gravel and fill material they want and 
~amage the use of the remainder. Under Mr. O'Conner's 
thinking, we had to show that there was no other land avail-
able to take the place of what they took. He forgets that 
appellant did not take the fee title. Appellant only took 
gravel fill and by doing so left a barrier right in the middle 
of our holdings that damages the use of the rest. I just hope 
he does not believe that we are under an obligation before-
we can obtain our severance damages to show that there is 
not,~ other fill materials that we can buy with which to fill up 
the hole. The application of the cases he cites is just about 
that absurd, to the facts in this case. We must go on forever 
paying taxes on this land that the diggings are on. Nothing 
can replace it. It isn't the loss in feed that does the damage. 
It is the cuts, the great excavations, the high banks, that were 
not leveled out, the location of the same in that it goes from 
one hill across the canyon to the other and on up through 
the canyon so that livestock cannot naturally make use of 
the owners' land. It makes the remaining lands actually of 
less value, either from a use standpoint or a leasing stand-
point. Consequently, unless the respondents are compensated 
for this difference in value that was there before the taking 
as compared after the taking, then the respondents will suffer 
and will not receive compensation as contemplated by the 
statutes of the State of Utah. The State v. Cooperative Security 
Corp., of Church, 247 P.2d 269, has no application either to 
the facts in this case, for the reasons set out above. 
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(b) THE DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPOND-
ENTS' WITNESSES WERE FROM APPELLANT'S 
OPERATIONS UPON LANDS OWNED BY RE-
SPONDENTS AND THEIR RIGHT OF ENTRY 
THEREON. 
(c) THE SO-CALLED {(SEVERANCE" DAMAGES 
TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES 
CONSISTED OF DAMAGES THAT WOULD RESULT 
TO AN OWNER IN THE USE OF HIS LAND IN 
LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS OR TO AN OWNER IF 
HE ATTEMPTED TO LEASE THE LANDS FOR A 
LIVESTOCK OPERATION BY THE LANDS BEING 
LESS DESIRABLE OR USEABLE TO A TENANT. 
(e) RESPONDENTS DID PRESENT COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE OF THE MARKET VALUE OF THEIR 
REMAINING LANDS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN 
DAMAGED.· 
When this problem was approached in the course of the 
trial, that is, what was Mr. Chournos testifying about when 
he gave his opinion as to the loss the respondents Hunter-
Arthur would suffer? The matter was completely threshed 
out and all agreed that it involved the Hunter-Arthur lands 
only (Tr. 172 line 1-24). 
Mr. Chournos later stated (Tr. 175-24): 
nA. I figured I've been damaged the same amount 
of money as the Sheehan people has." 
Mr. Keller, a rancher with years of experience and who 
at one time had all of the lands that are in coloring on the 
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exhibit showing ownership, either as owner or lessee (T r. 
221), was asked (Tr. 230-12): 
ctQ. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
the value of this land, for livestock operations, has 
been reduced on account of the pits that have been 
dug, in their present locale? I'm talking of the Hunter-
Arthur lease." 
He gave his opinion (Tr. 232-4) that they would be reduced 
in value in his opinion 25% or $1,750.00 per year and that 
would be based on a twenty ( 20) year period. 
There is another interesting thing that should be brought 
to, the court's attention and that is that Mr. Adams, the chief 
witness for the appellant, had the Hunter-Arthur lease at the 
time of the hearing and testified that he ·would be willing 
to renew it (Tr. 263-4) but it later developed, after he was 
cross-examined, that he had been inconvenienced in his sheep 
operation because of the railroad's operations and cuts (Tr. 
277) and he admitted that the Southern Pacific had taken 
care of him. The question was asked (Tr. 277-18): 
'' Q. In other words, the Southern Pacific Railroad 
considered that you and your leases and your operation 
were injured because of the digging and so on up 
through there. 
A. Yes, sir." 
And he admitted (Tr. 278-3) that they had paid him the 
sum of $2,500.00 per year. He later said (Tr. 285-21) that 
is what they gave him for disturbance and later said (Tr. 
287-16) that it didn't cover acreage, it's the nuisance. Con· 
sequently we get right down to this. He had the leases on 
36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Hunter-Arthur lands. He had some lands of his own. He 
couldn't run his sheep operation or enjoy the leases or the 
fruits therefrom in the same manner that he had done before 
the appellant came in to disrupt everything. The appellant, 
through its engineer at the location of the project, recognized 
the injury due to the taking and the resulting damage that was 
caused to the lessee of the Hunter-Arthur people and as a 
result paid him $2,500.00 annually over and above any sums 
due by contract for the fill material. The damages testified to 
by respondents' witnesses were not so great but the injury 
will be forever the same. 
Mr. O'Conner claims tha the damages as testified to cover 
profits and/ or losses to a business carried on, but we do not 
interpret it as such. The loss of rental that would be suffered 
yearly was converted to purchase price or market value by 
formula (Tr. 232) over a twenty year period. 
(d) RESPONDENTS' DAMAGES WERE NOT AR-
RIVED AT BY ADDING THE VALUES OF DIFFER-
ENT USES FOR THE LAND TAKEN. 
(f) THE TESTIMONY DOES ESTABLISH SEVER-
ANCE DAMAGE OF RESPONDENTS' LANDS AS 
THAT TERM IS CONTEMPLATED AND USED IN 
THE COURT DECISIONS AND THE STATUTES. 
The writer does not quarrel with the attorney for the 
appellant on the law or what the cases he has presented 
attempt to prove, but rather on his interpretation of the facts 
of the case. We claim and I sincerely believe that the evidence 
.proves that we are entitled to: 
1 
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1. The reasonable fair market value for the fill materials 
taken. 
2. We also claim that at the place appellan~s chose to 
take the fill materials and from the manner in which they have 
taken them, that they have rendered our remaining lands less 
useful and as a consequence we have been damaged by the 
lands remaining having a srnaller rea:sonable fair market 
value, after the taking, than they had prior to the taking . 
. We are not claiming loss of forage from the gravel pits. 
If we did, then we would be claiming double damages. This 
case is not one where the fee is taken, but one where the whole 
face of the land is changed by the taking~ 
Our statute, in condemnation, is somewhat similar to the 
California Code. In 10 Cal. Jur., page 340, we have: 
nArticle 55. Damage to Property Not Taken:-
Where the property sought to be condemned consti-
tutes only a part of a larger parcel, the compensation 
to be awarded includes not only the value of the prop-
erty taken but also the damages which will accrue to 
the remainder by reason of its severance from the 
portion sought and the construction of the improvement 
in the manner proposed. So whatever tends directly 
and substantiallv to diminish the value of the tract 
left to the own~r should be weighed and considered 
in awarding him damages. Thus it is proper to consider 
such a depreciation in value as is caused by the en-
hanced danger of floods or seepage on the property 
not taken from the manner of the use of the property 
taken. And such damage may be considered as the 
cutt~ng off fr.om a tract of streams or springs of water, 
the 1nconven1ent form o.r shape of the remaining land 
on account of the pubhc use, and other like injuries 
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to the property not taken. It has been held that double 
damages are not assessed against a condemning party 
when the jury takes into consideration the value of 
the land taken arising from its availability for use in 
conjunction with the land not taken, and also the 
damage caused to the land not taken by its availability 
for use in con junction with the land taken." (See 
numerous cases cited.) 
CONCLUSION 
It appears to the writer at the present time there are really 
two judgments before the· court. One for the value of the 
materials taken and one for the severance damages. It also 
appears that this court may affirm both judgments, or may 
affirm one and send one back, or may send both back. 
We are now at the point in this condemnation proceedings 
that has been promised that we would be in by counsel for the 
appellant. That is, that if we didn't take its offer that any 
judgment we might obtain would have to be supported by 
a Supreme Court decision. We, in turn, have advised it that 
we were not afraid to present our case to the Supreme Court 
in order to obtain our legal and equitable rights in this matter. 
We further say, however, that the cost of these proceedings 
are not as easily borne by us as they might be by the appellant. 
That if the court should determine that any portion of the 
matter should be tried over, then, I assume the court would 
, sustain the balance of the judgment. This would then make 
it possible for respondents to be compensated, and they would 
then have the wherewith to carry on the fight. The record 
: shows that appellant took possession October 22nd, 1957. Any 
portion of this that might be retried will again have to go 
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before two courts if we proceed on our past experience with 
this appellant. 
We sincerely believe, however, from the evidence pre-
sented, that we are entitled to the full amount as determined 
by the jury and that the judgment of the lower court should 
be sustained for the reasons set out in our brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WAL11ER G. MANN, 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent 
Helen Sheehan Arthur 
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